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ON THE NECESSITY OF PRESERVING ACCESS TO STATE COURTS
AND CIVIL JUSTICE: REDISCOVERING FEDERALISM & DEBUNKING
“FRAUDULENT” JOINDER
I. State Tort Law Reflects Fundamental Values and Protects Vital Interests
With nothing less than the survival of the civil justice system hanging in the balance, tort reformers and tort law defenders have
been locked in a conflict that spans the last four decades. 1  Courts and legislatures at every level (federal, state, and local) are
besieged by those who seek to limit or eliminate tort liability, limit or eliminate accountability for personal injury, and limit
or eliminate the capacity of those wronged by misconduct of every type to have access to courts, juries, *161  and justice. 2
Defenders of the civil justice system, 3  a loosely coalesced amalgam of consumer groups, attorneys, and academics, devote
themselves to protecting that same system. 4
Those seeking the spoils of the tort reform wars (caps on punitive damages and noneconomic loss, elimination of the capacity to
pursue class actions at the state level, limitations on the use of evidence, elimination of strict liability, joint and several liability,
and much, much more) would not only disagree with the above assessment, they would be offended. 5  Tort reformers see theirs
as a mission of essential change, reform, a quest for modernization of an outdated system that misallocates resources, suppresses
innovation, weakens the U.S. economy and the U.S. position in international commerce, destroys jobs, and unduly privileges
a very small number of consumers and their lawyers. 6
*162  Defenders of the civil justice system assess things quite differently. From their perspective, while the civil justice system
is not perfect, it is remarkably fair, constitutionally sound, and vitally important to the dual goals of safety and efficiency for all
goods and services. 7  At its best, it provides an even playing field where a person of limited or no means fairly and justly can
confront interests--corporations, other entities, and individuals--of great means. 8  As such, tort law substantively and access to
justice procedurally, must be guarded and supported, not attacked. 9
As in any prolonged conflict, the mode of attack shifts over time. 10  Once success is achieved in one domain by one side of a
conflict (e.g., in a number of states, the elimination of strict liability or limitations on punitive damages), the substantive focus
moves to other aspects of the field. 11  *163  Current targets of tort reform are the very nature of legal process including class
actions, 12  and the roles of state courts 13  and federal agencies. 14  Of these three areas, the effort to minimize the essential
and constitutionally driven role of state courts, a topic central to this article, surfaces in the Fraudulent Joinder Prevention
Act of 2016. 15  The House report on this bill makes clear the purpose of the drafters--and also reveals a troubling and false
characterization of attorneys in this field: “The current law ... allows trial lawyers to keep their cases in state court [and defeat
a motion to remove to federal court] ... so as long as they also sue a local [in-state] defendant .... [T]his body of law has been
abused by trial lawyers who fraudulently [join] local defendants, even though ... those defendants have little or no support in
fact or law ....” 16  Insulting, prejudicial legislative pronouncements of this nature add nothing to the debate and demonstrate
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the determination of tort reformers to force litigation into federal court thus limiting or eliminating the critical role of state
courts, local judges, and local juries.
Rather than invite a discourse that might actually illuminate the issues in the field, those supporting tort reform rely on
inflammatory verbiage characterizing defendants sued as innocent *164  “hostages” or victims rather than acknowledging that
those parties may, in fact, be responsible for the harm the plaintiff sustained. 17  While this is speculation, it is just a matter of
time before this one-sided legislative proposal is referred to as the “Innocent Victims Act” or words to that effect. 18
While the tort reform dispute has transformed, 19  the core goals have not: this fight is now and always has been about access to
justice, accountability, and the potential to deter future misconduct. 20  Victims of negligence and other forms of misconduct--
the plaintiff community--see tort reform initiatives as unfair and ill-advised substantive limits on damages, unfair and dangerous
changes in legal process, unwise limits on who can bear liability, and ill-advised constraints on the rules of evidence and
procedure. In short, tort reform has come to mean the broad-based imposition of a growing number of pernicious, powerful,
and comprehensive obstacles to civil justice.
Those pursuing tort reform--entities from manufacturing, retailing, healthcare (pharmaceuticals, medical providers, hospitals,
health insurance), those providing professional *165  services (legal, architectural, medical, engineering, and more), and even
members of the media seeking to be relieved of the reach of defamation law--seek gross limits on liability, changes in legal
process, and certainty in terms of liability exposure. They share the hope that they can know in advance their potential liability
so that they can pass along those costs to consumers, breeding into the price of the products they sell and services they provide
the full expanse of tort liability.
Those fighting tort reform understand the hazard of providing the precise means to determine liability exposure in advance; to
do so would eliminate, in large part, one critical force driving the tort system--deterrence of misconduct.
The fight for a vibrant and potent tort system has rumbled along for decades. It is a struggle for the survival of a grand and
historic system of civil justice. This is a fight worth fighting.
II. The U.S. System of Civil Justice Should Be Celebrated, Not Vilified
The last four decades have witnessed an ever-changing and nearly continuous challenge to the most accessible of legal fora,
the state courts. One is hard-pressed to see how these attacks on the civil justice system even vaguely constitute reform. For
those injured by a defective product or misconduct that gives rise to an actionable state tort claim, one would think “reform”
would include facilitating, not limiting or barring claims, 21  access to state courts where in-state judges 22  can oversee a fair
and impartial process and where one has a right to be judged by a jury of their peers.
This is about the system of civil justice, with origins in the most fundamental of rights--the right to be free from violence,
torment and torture, to possess and hold personal and real property, the right not to be confined without basis, the right to be
free from the damaging, dangerous *166  irresponsible acts of others. 23  If that list is familiar, it is because those are the five
ancient trespassory torts as well as trespass on the case or negligence--and the roots go back, and back, and back. They are
the bedrock of tort law. 24
Left to others are the deeper reasons why we have spent 40 years fighting to maintain the system that preserves these rights.
Likewise left to others is an attempt to explain just why attacks on this most fundamental aspect of civil justice are an important
plank in political platforms for the last six presidential races. 25  Instead, the premise for this work is more straightforward: Tort
law generates far-reaching and positive market effects beyond victim compensation and recovery.
III. Deterrence Matters
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Civil judgments, settlements, the potential for litigation--the tort system itself--has a beneficial effect on the behavior of those
who are the subject of legal action as well as others in the same or similar lines of commerce. In short, the system of tort law is
an engine of deterrence. The actual or potential imposition of civil tort liability changes the behavior of others. 26
This is not a fanciful field dealing with esoteric interests. Tort law involves the hard business of loss, of life and death, fairness,
justice, economic common sense and economic survival, competition in increasingly globalized markets, and accountability--
no small task. 27  This system is about the promise of justice--and for victims, the potent and oft expressed hope that the tort
*167  system will be the vehicle that prevents repetition of their tragedy. 28  Families and victims do not want their tragedy
to be a loss in vain. 29  Tort law is their hope. Individuals and entities brought to justice establish models for future actions
producing positive incentives that lessen the probability that others will suffer the same harm they experienced. That is the
reality of deterrence. 30
To deny this effect is to deny the collective reality of the human experience. 31  Frankly, it is hard to conceive of a healthy
economic model where rational actors ignore clear warning signs and thus render themselves vulnerable to sanctions or
punishment.
To argue that the prospect of civil liability has little or no effect on future behavior collides with a common understanding of
how we react to the potential of punishment. 32  The presumptive operating assumption of courts is not just that they will be
there to provide a neutral accounting-like function to compensate an injured party, but that they will be sending a message heard
clearly by those engaged in similar market practices. To think otherwise is to undervalue the obvious and deny the common
human experience. 33
Although the goal of “making a plaintiff whole” is essential and laudable, the simple fact is that money is not the only goal.
Money approximates loss and covers expenses; money alters financial possibilities and provides remedial potential--but justice
requires more: the avoidance of similar harms, or deterrence--the best side of our collective sense of justice and fairness will
be preserved. 34  That is the tort system.
*168  Tort law--civil justice--walks with us. 35  Tort law follows our families, sits quietly in the school dining room, and
hovers over the workplace. Tort law joins you as you click on your seatbelt in your car or apply the brakes. Tort law is the
unmasked presence in the operating room and pharmacy. Tort law is among the authors of increasingly thorough informed
consent statements that provides an understanding of treatment to be administered and options to treatment. Tort law lives in
appliances and bicycles, hand tools and the endless variations of machinery that shape our lives. Tort law presses toward truth--
and tolerates errors and certain mistruths, facilitating free speech. Tort law warns and sanctions those who would steal ideas
and innovation or otherwise corrupt the marketplace. Tort law fights the battle for clean air and water and safe food. Tort law
urges competency in medicine and an array of learned professions. To insult this field, to pretend it is about greedy lawyers
and clients who set out to extract undeserved riches, is outrageous. 36  This is a field of consequence. It is played out in the
state courts--and that is where it belongs.
Limiting tort liability will not improve justice and will dilute or destroy critical forces that push the providers of all goods and
services to find safer, more efficient, and more competitive products and processes. In fact, it will do the opposite.
In those areas where so-called tort reforms have been implemented, they have stripped deserving persons of their right to justice
and remedy and also “had [many] unintended consequence[s].” 37  Tort reform, and especially caps on damages, has reduced
“the ability of the *169  most severely injured claimants to get representation. [T]hese provisions inhibit the ideals of access
to justice and equality before the law that are fundamental principles of justice.” 38
IV. State Courts Are the Proper Venue for Tort Cases
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Federalism, the allocation of power that makes Congress responsible for those functions enumerated in the Constitution and
those activities in interstate commerce but leaves the matter of the police powers (the health, safety, and welfare of citizens) to
the states, is under attack. History and precedent affirm the virtue of state courts to protect citizens, evolve new standards, and
achieve just and fair resolution of claims. 39  This is by design, predicated on a fundamental belief that advocacy for individual
rights properly belongs in state court. This concept predates the founding of the republic. “Colonial leaders took up arms in 1776
not simply because they found Parliament's actual policies during the 1760's and 1770's intolerable in fact, but also because--
as a matter of principle--they could not accept the British idea that Parliament had legitimate authority to do anything it wanted
to the colonies ... 40
Recognition of the importance of federalism and, concomitantly, the importance of state courts, is evident in the Federalist
Papers. “Federalism's first achievement was to enable the American people to secure the benefits of national union without
imperiling their republican institutions.” 41  Rather than fear of the power of state courts to impose accountability, the power of
state courts to protect the citizens of a state can be seen as, “a celebration of local autonomy [and] in a way a *170  celebration,
and a protection, of individual liberty.” 42  When the power of state courts is diluted and federal “controls” are imposed, “[t]he
result is a constitutional arrangement that diminishes liberty [and leaves] much of the original Constitution in disarray.” 43
From the founding of the Republic, the expectation has been that the states would be the primary forum for the protection of
rights and interests of citizens and that the power of the federal courts and the Congress itself would be carefully confined or
limited. Like the Class Action Fairness Act, 44  the legislative initiatives discussed below (the Fraudulent Joinder Act 45  and
the Separation of Powers Restoration Act 46  ) abandon that most vital premise. 47
The Supreme Court has long recognized the hazard of undue assertion of federal power. “[T]he scope of [federal] power must be
considered in the light of our dual system of government, and may not be extended so as ... effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.” 48  From 1789 forward, the 10 th
Amendment in the Bill of Rights made explicit that the states were to play a vital role in protecting the interests of citizens.
“[The] Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to ensure that the important role promised the States by the proponents
of the Constitution was realized.” 49  Maintaining the proper balance between the state and federal courts is not a particularly
simple task 50 --but it is an essential endeavor.
*171  V. State Courts, Essential Experimentation, and Federalism
Beyond constitutional structure and the responsibility of state courts to protect the citizens of that state, there are both the
benefits and hazards of localism. The downside, of course, is that out-of-state defendants may perceive the system as weighted
against them--in which case, if they are genuinely out-of-state, they may seek to remove a case to federal court. Distilled to its
most base level, after removal, plaintiffs prevail less frequently in federal court than in state court. “Removal of civil cases from
state to federal court results in a precipitous drop in the plaintiffs' win rate. As we have previously reported, the overall win rate
in federal civil cases is 57.97%, but in the subset of those cases that have been removed the win rate is only 36.77%.” 51
The benefits are equally clear and of great consequence. State courts have an opportunity to implement a broad range of options
to achieve a prompt and fair resolution of civil disputes. The notion that the states are laboratories designed to improve the
civil justice system has been fundamental to our jurisprudence for generations. As the Supreme Court noted in 1937, it is one
of the “happy incidents” of our legal system. 52  Beyond that most significant benefit, there is the matter of simple federalism
and access to justice: in-state plaintiffs have every right to pursue justice in their home forum for the resolution of a claim
sounding in tort. 53  That state courts have an interest in providing a forum for the citizens of their state does not suggest a
bias or a lack of fairness, the implicit assumptions in the tort reform argument. 54  Instead, it suggests the proper role of state
courts and the importance of viewing the states as independent judicial systems that have the potential to explore differing
doctrines, theories, and strategic approaches to address injury. State *172  courts acting to address novel theories or cases of
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first impression become non-binding exemplars from which all other states as well as federal courts can assess the efficacy or
proprietary of different remedial theories.
Charles Fried noted that, “by disaggregating governmental power, there may be an impetus toward innovation, toward
experimentation.” 55  To limit state courts by relentlessly pushing personal injury controversies either into arbitration 56  or
federal forma 57  runs afoul of one of the most fundamental virtues of federalism. There is no better expression of this virtue
than the Court's decision in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann: “To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 58
Beyond the loss of state courts as laboratories, the current push to federal courts, away from state courts, 59  compromises
essential parts of governmental balance. 60  Federalism, in its many and varied forms, is a central republican construct, and
vibrant state tort law is one component parts of *173  that system. “Court[s] must ... preserve meaningful state sovereignty
over some part of the purely internal commerce of the states; and to ensure the separation of state and federal government
operations. Without judicial protection for the checks and balances at the heart of our Constitution, those checks and balances
will continue to dissolve.” 61
The arguments for strong and independent state tort law are fully compatible with the notion of maintaining, where appropriate,
aggressive regulatory structures. In numerous fields, e.g., health care, environmental law, transportation law, securities law,
and telecommunications, it is vitally important that federal agencies are able to accomplish their delegated tasks. Curiously,
even in that regard, those seeking tort reform have, almost inexplicably, sought to undermine those federal agencies that can
protect consumer interests.
This aspect of the attack on consumerism (another way to describe tort reform) comes in the form of the preposterous Separation
of Powers Restoration Act, 62  a bill that would neuter federal agencies and give federal judges power beyond anything even
remotely required by the Supreme Court 63  or envisioned in the constitution. 64  This legislation reflects tort reform overreaching
at a level that defies description. Presumably, because federal agencies just might provide a forum that mandates accountability
for those who have sold or manufactured defective products, legislation was proposed to neutralize those agencies by making
any significant decisions those agencies render *174  subject to de novo review in federal court. This proposal would be
laughable where it not for the fact that it appears to be taken seriously in certain influential quarters. 65
If there is anything remotely defensible about the aforementioned legislation, it might be that it acknowledges the difficulty
of sorting out those injuries that are most properly addressed through a federal regulatory structure and those that are most
properly addressed in a state tort action. This difficulty was recognized by the Supreme Court more than half a century ago:
“The interpenetrations of modern society have not wiped out state lines. It is not for us to make inroads upon our federal system
either by indifference to its maintenance or excessive regard for the unifying forces of modern technology. Scholastic reasoning
may prove that no activity is isolated within the boundaries of a single State, but that cannot justify absorption of legislative
power by the United States over every activity.” 66  That difficulty, however, is hardly the basis for one of the most hypocritical
legislative initiatives of the last hundred years.
Just how giving the judiciary unprecedented power over federal agencies restores separation of powers is anybody's guess. 67
On its face, the bill does the opposite--turning on its head the most fundamental notions of checks and balances. One wonders:
is all this necessary to protect companies and individuals who have injured consumers?
Unless there has been a sea change and suddenly, judicial activism is a virtue and unelected judges have mystically been
granted enhanced constitutional authority, the bill is nothing more than a transparent attack on legal mechanisms set up to insure
accountability. If there is anything to consistency, this bill should be seen as an endorsement of judicial activism, the bane of
those  *175  supporting tort reform for decades. More than a century ago, Professor James Thayer laid down the gauntlet,
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attacking judicial activism as inconsistent with any coherent construction of constitutional law, a quest that has been central to the
conservative agenda--until now. 68  Judicial activism had been declared evil: “[J]udicial activism, the results-oriented approach
to judging ... is simply inconsistent with representative self-government and the rule of law. It is similar to, and even more
dangerous than, the decline of constitutionalism among lawmakers ....” 69  Now, presumably, it has been ... tort reformed? 70
In the event that there is any question about the tort reform goal of limiting or eliminating state courts as a primary forum for
the resolution of civil tort claims or the desire to avoid accountability derived through agency action, one need do no more than
peruse the recent legislative track record of those supporting tort reform. As mentioned, the Class Action Fairness Act 71  has
the purpose and effect of forcing litigants into federal court or simply making it impossible for injured persons to join forces
in that efficient litigation model, the class action, and succeed. 72  Similarly, as noted, the Separation of Powers Restoration
Act, 73  if passed, would gravely limit the ability of federal agencies to protect consumer interests and leave to judges (who may
well lack substantive or technical expertise in the field regulated) the impossible task of assessing the propriety and efficacy
*176  of regulatory actions. 74  Add to this the resurgence of interest in direct congressional review of agency action or bills
designed to inhibit or freeze regulatory action and the goal of limiting or eliminating liability in state court or at the agency
level becomes transparent.
Consider the renewed interest in the heretofore rarely used Congressional Review Act (“CRA”). 75  If brought to the fore on a
regular basis, the CRA would wreak havoc with the convention of separation of powers by placing recently enacted and future
major regulatory actions 76  before Congress for an up-or-down vote. 77
Next is the REINS Act, a bill that would freeze regulatory actions and require, prior to implementation, an affirmative vote by
both the House and the Senate. This would apply to “major rules,” turning agency rulemaking into a legislative and political
side-show event where consumer interests are likely to be lost in the shuffle. 78  Among other things, the REINS Act requires a
vote in a 70-day timeframe with no amendments possible rendering effective regulation nearly impossible. 79
Two final bills round off the anti-accountability agenda. The ironically named Regulatory Accountability Act 80  would impose
complex cost-based rules on regulation, including health and safety rules, where such analysis is literally impossible. 81  Lastly,
the SEC Regulatory Accountability *177  Act 82  would impose on the Securities Exchange Commission the obligation to study
all alternative means to achieve a regulatory goal prior to the adoption of a rule, a requirement that does not exist at any other
agency. In fact, it is axiomatic in administrative law that while fair and rational decisionmaking compels agencies to consider
reasonable alternatives, that does not and cannot mean any and every alternative. 83  Given the creativity of those opposing
regulation, it is fair to say that there could be endless alternatives one could dream up to bring to a halt agency action. Thus,
a regulatory obligation of that nature would make it impossible for an agency to do much of anything--which, presumably, is
the goal of the sponsors.
The statues and bills just discussed vary, one to the next, but their import does not. None of them are designed to support the
constitutionally mandated design of federalism. None of them support state courts and none even remotely respect the Founders
imperative that in this republic, the states bear primary responsibility for the health, safety, and welfare of the people. None
of them deal meaningfully with interstate commerce or areas where there is a strong federal interest in an area (e.g., nuclear
power or commercial aviation). None of them advance the interests of injured consumers. None of them facilitate or improve
access to justice.
These initiatives represent an attempt to use the power of Congress to deny the states their right to serve the best interests of
their residents and to serve the vital role as laboratories of justice. Each initiative, in its own way, does the opposite--each limits,
restricts, or obscures access to justice.
VI. Debunking Fraudulent Joinder
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*178  Perhaps nothing reflects more the troubling perspective of the current tort reform struggle than the Fraudulent Joinder
Prevention Act (“FJPA”). 84  If the goal of tort reform is to make it difficult or impossible for injured parties to have access to
justice, to a state court, a jury, and a fair hearing in an impartial forum, the FJPA would achieve that pernicious objective. “[I]t
is clear from the bill's radical changes to longstanding jurisdictional practice that the true purpose of this measure is simply to
stifle the ability of plaintiffs to have their choice of forum, and possibly even their day in court.” 85
For decades, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 86  (“FRCP”), the carefully crafted body of rules that govern process in Article
III courts, established the structure and procedure governing the litigation process. While there is always room for change, 87
the FRCP reflect the work of the Judicial Conference of the United States, congressional committees, the advisory committees,
diverse groups that, almost by definition, are impartial.
Among many other aspects of legal process, the FRCP govern removal from state court to federal court when, inter alia, a case
is initiated by an in-state plaintiff against an out-of-state defendant. 88  Removal will fail if another defendant is joined who is
in-state, thus defeating diversity. 89  To avoid having a case heard in state court, those supporting tort reform crafted the FJPA, a
bill designed to address fraudulent joinder, facilitating removal from state court to federal court, addressing the possibility that
the plaintiff will somehow, “fraudulently” shift defendants, *179  adding an in-state defendant to defeat diversity. 90  In fact,
wrongful fraudulent joinder is covered thoroughly and effectively under the FRCP. 91  The need for this “fix” is not just suspect,
it is nonexistent. Federal Rule 17(a) requires that lawsuits proceed with the “real party in interest” and addresses joinder and
party substitution explicitly. 92  Federal Rule 21 deals specifically with misjoinder or fraudulent joinder. 93
Despite the process and remedies in the FRCP, supporters of the FJPA contend that even more protection is needed to guard
against the possibility of losing a quest for removal thus requiring a defendant to stand trial in state court. 94  The FJPA could be
read as a check against any possible shift in party status that would prevent defendants from removing a case from state court
to federal court. This raises an obvious question: why are defendants so intent on having cases heard in federal court?
The purpose of this article is not to parse the specifics of the FRCP but rather to comment on the importance of federalism,
in this instance referring to the importance of providing in-state plaintiffs access to justice in state courts before a state court
judge and the jury of their peers.
The FJPA is not supported by any credible empirical evidence, reflects a patent bias against federalism, is antithetical to
fundamental notions of the rights of states to govern their citizens, and presupposes both bad faith and the inability of state
and federal court judges to apply the current FRCP regarding in personam jurisdiction and removal. Motives underlying the
FJPA are not subtle--the goal is to push cases to federal court where the chance the defendant will prevail is greater. 95  *180
Thus, for producers of defective goods or providers of services who fail to exercise due care, it only makes sense to seek the
forum least friendly to plaintiffs.
On its face, the FJPA has no purpose other than to reduce access to justice in state court. While there are anecdotes about
defendants who claim to have been “victimized” by having to endure state court justice, 96  they are insufficient to require a
change in the FRCP--particularly when the bill is designed to correct a problem that does not exist.
Imagine a plaintiff suffering from a personal injury residing in any small town anywhere in the United States. Imagine that
plaintiff retaining local counsel and being advised that a suit can be filed in the local courts to pursue their claim. Now, once
the litigation process has started, imagine that plaintiff learning that the case has been stripped from their local courthouse and
move to a federal court, often hours away, to be tried before judges not necessarily from that state--and then being advised that
the probability of prevailing is simply less. 97  That is not the plight of a few “national defendants” who are suddenly forced
into state court. That is the plight of plaintiffs from many, many communities throughout the country.
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The FJPA is tort reform at its worst. If successful, it's hard to see how the FJPA would achieve anything beyond making it
difficult to hold certain defendants accountable in state court. 98  It was characterized by Congressman John Conyers as a “bill
[that] attempts to solve a non-existent problem ... [raising] fundamental federalism concerns .... [and denying] state courts the
ability to decide and ultimately to shape state law.” 99
*181  One of the arguments supporting FJPA and other aspects of the tort reform over the years focuses on efficiency, 100  i.e.,
removal to a federal court offers the hope of more uniform process in a more neutral environment. First, there really is nothing
to support the argument in terms of empirical evidence. Second, tort reform advocates have not beat a consistent path to efficient
outcomes. For example, when a California resident plaintiff sued Bristol Myers Squibb for harms related to the use of Plavix,
plaintiffs from 34 states with similar complaints sought to participate in the suit, creating the potential for a highly efficient
consolidated process in which the defendant would need to defend itself just once instead of doing so in 34 different states.
Rather than take advantage of the efficiency, the defendant (along with a host of other groups supporting tort reformers) fought
the consolidation, taking the matter to the California Supreme Court--and lost. The Court addressed the matter thusly: “To be
sure, a single court hearing the claims of hundreds of plaintiffs is a significant burden on [a] court. But the overall savings of
time and effort [to the parties and] to the judicial system, both in California and interstate, far outweigh the burdens placed on
the individual forum court.” 101
If the goal is efficiency in litigation, something that was supposed to be a virtue of the Class Action Fairness Act, 102  is likewise
a purported goal of compulsory arbitration, 103  why fight here? While this may be unduly cynical, it would appear that the fight
was undertaken to increase the difficulty of the plaintiffs from outside of California who wanted to pursue their claim in the
unified *182  way. In other words, this reflects a current premise of tort reform: do what is possible to make it more difficult
for injured people to get access to justice. If the hope is to avoid liability, presumably that justifies fighting at every juncture.
VII. Preemption
In one core area in this field, preemption, the Supreme Court 104  and Congress 105  have already provided a dramatic and
systematic limitation on tort liability. 106  Preemption of state tort claims can be the result of express congressional action or
by implication, e.g., congress has fully occupied the field, it is not possible to implement the federal regulatory scheme if state
tort actions are permitted, or finding that tort actions require a result different from and inconsistent with essential component
parts of a federal regulatory program. 107
Preemption of state tort liability is an obvious goal of those who seek to limit liability making the Separation of Powers
Restoration Act even more troubling, and making the motives of its backers more transparent. From the perspective of those
who seek to limit or eliminate accountability, what could be better than having common law tort actions barred by preemption
to make way for the implementation of a regulatory system--and then having the regulatory system neutered by giving District
Court judges de novo review power over significant regulatory action? 108
*183  Looking briefly at just pharmaceuticals, the problem of preemption becomes obvious--and of constitutional moment. 109
States have the responsibility to protect health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, i.e., police powers. Preemption renders that
protection outside the reach of state tort law ... and the Separation of Powers Restoration Act could render protect of citizens
through FDA regulation highly limited. In the pharmaceutical field, the broad-based elimination of the right to pursue a personal
injury claim should be the exception, not the norm. As the Court noted in Wyeth, the operating “assumption [is] that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” 110  Three decades earlier, the court affirmed the importance of a “federal-state balance,” cautioning that the power
of states to protect their citizens should “not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts.” 111  A
few years later, the Court instructed that making a preemption determination should be an exercise in ascertaining the plain and
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clear meaning of a statute, the “purpose of Congress,” which should be the “ultimate touchstone” in determining whether a field
was expressly or, by essential implicated, occupied thus preempting state tort claims. 112
In the decade that followed, the clarity of the approach gave way to a more opportunistic and irregular methodology. 113  From
that point forward, preemption, at least in the pharmaceutical  *184  field, has often, but not always, produced what devotees
of tort reform seek: limited or eliminated access justice, to state courts, and to juries of one's peers. 114
A recent analysis of this dynamic by Professors John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky finds that preemption, “has
given [a range of] defendants vast protections from state law tort liability.” 115  In cases involving defective products generally,
“a plaintiff's rights to recover damages ... under common law are greatly diminished from what they were in the early 1990s ....
[T]he Supreme Court has now effectively immunized the manufacturers of generic drugs ... from products liability claims
[generally and for claims regarding] ... medical devices that go through the FDA's full preclearance procedures.” 116  Goldberg
and Zipursky conclude: “Preemption is now front and center in modern tort law .... [The Court] has gradually moved, albeit
inconstantly, in a direction that is as hostile to negligence and products liability plaintiffs as it is to libel plaintiffs.” 117
Instead of accountability, “most people harmed by prescription generic drugs have lost their access to the courts [and discovered
that federal courts and regulatory remedies do not] provide a complete replacement for the generally applicable state-law
remedies ....” 118
From a public health perspective, not only does this preclude the right to have harms redressed in a court but it also
“compromise[s] incentives for monitoring consumer safety risks by *185  negating the legal remedies of consumers who wish
to bring design-defect claims after experiencing dangerous reactions to a generic drug.” 119
Rather than just provide a plaintiff damages (not that personal remedies are inconsequential), tort litigation is a powerful
engine that could have played a vital role in “help[ing] to uncover and assess risks that are not apparent to the [FDA] during
a drug's approval process.” 120  Instead, “[preemption jurisprudence] shield[s] generic drug manufacturers from liability and
generic drug users from a legal remedy ....” 121  Even without the horrific impact that the Separation of Powers Restoration Act
would have on effective regulation, “[t]he reality is that the FDA does not have the resources to perform the Herculean task of
monitoring comprehensively the performance of every drug on the market.” 122  Despite the reasonable public expectation that
FDA approved drugs are safe, “the FDA cannot safeguard our nation's drug supply on its own.” 123
VIII. Concluding Comments
The importance of providing an accessible and efficient forum to pursue personal injury claims is hardly a matter for debate. 124
Tort cases are the historic form of localized justice that establishes behavior norms (deterrence) and allows for the peaceful
resolution of disputes (individualized justice). While historians may dispute the precise timing of the first tort case, civil
resolution of disputes resolving personal injury claims date back thousands of years. 125  By the 13th *186  century, 126  recorded
caselaw emerges as a means of memorializing how and why a particular dispute was resolved, providing for the centuries that
followed a remarkably complex and rich narrative regarding legal process, fairness, simple justice, and remedial options, the
common law. 127
From the Magna Carta 128  forward, a formula emerged: claims should be resolved locally without violence, and an organized
system of writs 129  would help orchestrate those claims. Judges would need to be objective and familiar with the community's
unique characteristics or belief structure, and judgments, ultimately, would rest with both a jury of one's peers and then the
court itself. From this, concepts of fairness and equity emerged as did the importance of local justice that provided neither party
undue favor. In addition, concerns about the power of the sovereign in the Magna Charta 130  translate well to historic concerns
about the federal government noted earlier in this paper.
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The aforementioned process and values translate into 21st century civil justice with remarkable consistency. Limitations on
federal power, as noted in this paper, are part of the foundational quest of the Revolution in this country. 131  The importance of
state law, state courts, local juries, local judges, is enshrined constitutionally and doctrinally through federalism. The importance
of individual communities participating in the process of decision-making and ultimately *187  finding safe resolution for
disputes carries over exquisitely into the present. By Supreme Court 132  pronouncement, history, 133  and unquestionable public
policy, 134  state courts are and ought to be the primary forum for resolution of disputes between those who claim injury and
those accused of injuring.
The tort system in the 21st-century maintains the core of the procedural mechanisms and principles that flow as immutable
truth over time. This is a system to preserve, not vilify. This is a system that protects all of us and allows for fair resolution of
disputes. It is hardly the plaything of selfish actors. 135
The tort system maintains the dual goals it has always possessed: individual justice or remedy and the public act of deterrence,
i.e., institutionalized behavioral messaging that makes our world safer, more efficient, and forward looking. Initiatives like the
Prevention of Fraudulent Joinder Act and the Separation of Powers Restoration Act are antithetical to achieving the goals of
deterrence and peaceful resolution of disputes. Cramming personal injury cases into a federal court that is neither local nor
familiar, when simple statistics and common sense tell us that the plaintiff is disadvantaged, hardly advances the noble goals
the system can achieve.
That practical and theoretical nightmare, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act, would destroy the fundamental relationship
between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature. Just what that the bill would restore is hard to say. Certainly, it would
restore nothing remotely resembling any *188  extant separation of powers model. 136  Moreover, it requires one to believe
that its proponents, business interests that have railed against judicial activism for generations, have decided, quite suddenly,
that judicial activism is suddenly the right way to go. Beyond endorsing a model of judicial action that contravenes the most
basic constitutionally prescribed structure of government, the bill would greatly diminish the juridical competence of agencies
to articulate enforceable norms. The bill vests discretionary power with federal court judges who have no claim to expertise, no
substantive background, no historical perspective on the regulatory structure, thus depriving the public of a critically important
and central form of governance.
The legislative proposals summarized above, coupled with an increasingly complex and unpredictable preemption environment,
present a situation that can only be referred to as a public hazard. If these bills become law, if preemption continues to stumble
forward in an irrational and destructive manner, if more and more cases are pushed into federal courts, the future will be grim
not only for innocent injured victims but for the very structure of governance and the legal system itself.
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